The standard model of strategic tax competition -the non-cooperative tax-setting behavior of jurisdictions competing for a mobile capital tax base -assumes that government policymakers are perfectly benevolent, acting solely to maximize the utility of the representative resident in their jurisdiction. We depart from this assumption by allowing for the possibility that policymakers also may be influenced by the rent-seeking (lobbying) behavior of businesses. Businesses recognize the factors affecting policymakers' welfare and may make campaign contributions to influence tax policy. This extension to the standard strategic tax competition model implies that business contributions may affect not only the levels of equilibrium tax rates but also the slope of the tax reaction function between jurisdictions. Thus, business campaign contributions may directly influence business tax rates, as well as indirectly shape tax competition, and enhance or retard the mobility of capital across jurisdictions.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a world of mobile capital, what factors determine business tax rates? The standard model of strategic tax competition assumes that government policymakers are perfectly benevolent, acting solely to maximize the utility of the representative resident in their jurisdiction. In this framework, business tax rates prevailing in a jurisdiction are heavily influenced by the tax policies pursued by its competitors. In addition to these strategic factors, tax rates may be influenced by the economic conditions and voters preferences within a state, as well as aggregate factors such as the business cycle and inflation.
However, as the quotation at the beginning of this paper reminds, business campaign contributions are likely to be an additional influential factor on policymakers. This paper investigates the empirical connections between business campaign contributions and tax rates at the state level. While few executives are as explicit as Mr. Holdren about the impact of campaign contributions, there is a pervasive belief that they have a marked impact on policy decisions. To motivate our empirical analysis, we depart from the standard tax competition paradigm by allowing policymakers' welfare to depend not only on the utility of the representative resident (as in the standard paradigm), but also on the level of business campaign contributions (raising policymakers' personal consumption and/or increasing their probability of reelection). 1 Residents' utility depends on private and public goods determined by residents' preferences, businesses' profit-maximizing decisions, and business tax rates. The expanded formulation of state policymakers' welfare recognizes that it is partly influenced by the rentseeking behavior of businesses, thus linking business campaign contributions to tax rates.
This departure from the standard strategic tax competition model implies that business campaign contributions may affect equilibrium tax rates. They may also affect the slope of the tax reaction function between jurisdictions. Thus, business campaign contributions may directly influence business tax rates, as well as indirectly shape tax competition, and enhance or retard the mobility of capital across jurisdictions.
These channels are examined by combining U.S. state panel data on capital tax policy and other relevant state-level economic and political variables with newly-compiled state-level data on contributions to candidates for state office. The latter data are constructed from contribution-level records compiled by the National Institute for Money in State Politics (NIMSP). These records are required by law to be publicly disclosed and hence cover nearly all candidates for state office. From these records, we construct at the state level the total amounts of contributions by type of giver (business vs. non-business), type of office (e.g., house, governor), and type of candidate (e.g., winning, incumbent). These contributions are sizeable.
During the 2003 to 2006 period, $1.1 billion, or $3.77 per capita, was contributed by the business sector (defined below) to candidates for state offices. Of these contributions, approximately 33% went to gubernatorial candidates (including lieutenant governor candidates), another 33% to state senate candidates, 21% to state house candidates, and the remaining 12% to candidates for other state offices (e.g., attorneys general and state judges).
Our study begins in Section II with the standard empirical model in the tax competition literature. The initial empirical results are based on a reaction function relating tax policy in a given state to tax policies in a competitive set of states and various control variables. We then augment this model with our business campaign contributions variable.
Our state-level dataset is introduced in Section III. The dataset contains four business tax variables -the statutory (marginal) corporate income tax rate, the investment tax credit rate, the capital apportionment weight (in the state's formula for apportioning a business' nationwide income), and the average (effective) corporate tax rate -and additional political variables that determine business taxes and that serve as instruments. Our data on state-level campaign contributions are also discussed.
We then turn to our empirical results. In Section IV, we find that the reaction function is negatively sloped; that is, after accounting for state and time effects and economic and political variables at the state level, tax policy in a given state moves inversely with the corporate income tax rate and the capital apportionment weight. To assess the role of business campaign contributions, we augment the reaction function with business contributions to candidates for the state house (assembly). We find little evidence that business contributions affect the slope of the reaction function. However, we document a significant direct effect of business campaign contributions on the level of tax policy.
Section V interprets these results in terms of the economic value of campaign contributions. How much are corporate taxes reduced per $1 of business contributions? We find that the economic value of a $1 business campaign contribution is approximately $6.65 in terms of lower state corporate taxes. This large gap between the benefits and the costs of business campaign contributions could be due to coordination failure on the part of businesses, leading to severe under-contribution by the business sector as a whole, or to binding state campaign contribution limits. These results call for further research aimed at understanding the determinants of business campaign contributions and the persistence of such a large gap between benefits and costs.
Section VI summarizes and concludes.
II. THE EMPIRICAL MODEL
The standard strategic tax competition model implies that equilibrium capital tax rates in a jurisdiction are determined by the tax rates prevailing in other jurisdictions that compete for the mobile capital tax base, as well as economic conditions and residents' preferences for public goods relative to private goods. This leads to an estimating equation for state i at time t of the following form, Brueckner (2003) , Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) , Case, Hines, and Rosen (1993) , and Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2008) use a similar estimating equation.
3 The limited variation in the time dimension is traceable to two aspects of our panel data. First, the four tax variables we examine have limited time variation in most states. This is particularly true for the capital apportionment weight, for which changes tend to be of a "one-and-done" nature (i.e., changes occur at most once or twice in the sample for most states). Second, our panel is unbalanced because only a few states have business campaign contributions data before the late 1990s (see the Based on these considerations, the following equation is the basis for the estimates reported in this paper,
III. THE PANEL DATASET
This section briefly describes the construction of the data used in this study. Details concerning the construction and data sources for the series discussed in this subsection can be found in the Data Appendix to .
B. Political Variables
The political preferences of state residents ( (e) the majority control of the legislature changed last year from DI or split (between R and DI chambers) to R;
(f) an interaction between the R governor and the R legislature indicator variables;
(g) an interaction between R governor and the DI legislature indicator variables (note that the omitted interaction category is R governor and a split legislature);
(h) the reelection of an incumbent governor last year;
(i) the reelection of a Republican incumbent governor last year.
We form first-order and second-order spatial lags (i.e., weighted averages with the same distance-weights used in constructing # i,t  ) of the above variables as potential instruments. Each of the four tax variables is projected against different subsets drawn from this set of potential instruments. The subset used in estimation for each tax variable is the same instrument sets selected in Chirinko and Wilson (2009b) based on an optimal instrument search algorithm described in footnote 4. The instrument sets are listed in the Notes To Table 2 .
Details concerning the construction and data sources for the series discussed in this subsection can be found in the Data Appendix to .
C. Business Campaign Contributions Variables
The business campaign contributions data are a unique part of this paper. The business campaign contributions variable used in the econometric analysis is defined as the logarithm of business campaign contributions made to candidates for the state house, per capita:
The set of possible instrumental variables for i,t BCC in the GMM estimation is drawn from the following list of six variables based on campaign contributions and the number of candidates:
(A) the level of campaign contribution limits for corporations to house candidates in that state;
(B) the number of candidates that ran for a state house seat;
(C) the amount of non-business campaign contributions to winning candidates;
(D) the amount of non-business contributions to losing candidates;
(E) the ratio of (c) to (d), as a measure of the funding competitiveness of races within the state;
(F) the amount of business contributions to candidates for other, non-tax-policy-setting state offices (i.e., offices other than governor, state house, or state senate).
The optimal instrument sets for i,t BCC are chosen in the same manner as for
footnote 4. Somewhat surprisingly, the optimal sets for i,t BCC are the same in each of the four models (which differ by the tax variable serving as the dependent variable) and consists of the single variable, the number of candidates that ran for a state house seat in state i and year t (item (B)).
Details concerning the construction and data sources for the series discussed in this subsection can be found in Appendix A.
Summary statistics for the business campaign contributions, tax, and control variables are presented in Table 1 . In Panel A, the "H", "S", "G", and "HSG" superscripts on the business campaign contributions variables ( X i,t $BCC ) refer to "House," "Senate," "Governor," and "House, Senate, and Governor combined," respectively. To ease interpretation, we present summary statistics for business campaign contributions per capita in levels ( ) has a substantial effect in reducing the variation in these variables relative to their in-state counterparts.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS

A. Tax Competition -Baseline Results
GMM estimates of the standard tax competition model, defined in equation (2) with the effect of BBC removed (by constraining the 's  to equal zero), are presented in Table 2 Comparable GMM estimates with the RE model are presented in columns 4 to 6. The  's continue to be negative. In the FE model, the estimated slope of the reaction function -
SCT is now statistically significant at the 10% level and that for CAW has a pvalue only somewhat above 10%. The  for ITC is very close to zero. This pattern of results may be partly explained by the quality of the instruments evaluated in panel C in columns 4, 5, and 6. For SCT and CAW , the instruments are both valid and relevant, as indicated by the J Statistic p-value (testing overidentifying restrictions) and the minimum eigenvalue statistic 7 We nonetheless include off-election years in the econometric analysis because tax changes are as likely or more likely to occur in off-election years. For 1990 to 2006, changes in the SCT have occurred 58%/42% of the time in off-election/election years. Comparable figures for the ITC and CAW are 55%/45% and 50%/50%, respectively. Moreover, the inclusion of time lags in our preferred specification requires time-contiguous data. 8 OLS results are presented in Appendix B below and in Chirinko and Wilson (2009a) , and they are similar to those reported in Table 2 below.
(testing the correlation between # i,t  and the instruments), respectively. The low value of the latter statistic suggests that the instruments for ITC are weak.
The results from Table 2 indicate that the slopes of the reaction function for SCT and CAW are negative and suggest the importance of tax competition in determining these capital tax policies. Though a negatively-sloping reaction function may seem counter-intuitive, it is not inconsistent with the theory of strategic tax competition and has been found previously in other empirical work (Chirinko and Wilson, 2009b) . The intuition for a negative slope from a model of strategic tax competition is as follows. Suppose the out-of-state tax rate rises. This increase will cause mobile capital to flow into the state in question, raising the state's tax base. If the income elasticity of residents' demand for public goods (relative to private goods) is negative, residents may prefer to use this "windfall" to finance a tax cut, which would result in a negativesloping reaction function. In this case, residents view existing public services as adequate and recognize that, with their now-larger tax base, they can maintain the existing level of public services at a lower tax rate and shift consumption toward more private goods.
B. The Role of Business Campaign Contributions
The distinctive contribution of this study is to quantify the role of business campaign contributions on business tax policy. Does (2) by GMM. The results based on the RE and FE models are shown in Table 3 , columns 1 to 3 and 4 to 6, respectively. The instruments for # i,t τ are the same as those used in Table 2 However, we find that business campaign contributions have a direct effect on tax policy in a direction favorable to business. As shown in Panel B of Table 3 , the sign of the estimated  is negative for SCT and CAW, the two tax variables that increase business costs, and  is positive for ITC, the tax policy that lowers business costs. This pattern holds for both the RE and FE models. In the RE model,  is statistically significant (at conventional levels) for both SCT and CAW, but not for ITC. In the FE model,  remains significant for CAW, has a p-value slightly above 0.10 for SCT, and remains insignificant for ITC.
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The economic significance of these estimates will be assessed in the following section.
Here we simply note that the estimated  from column 4 of . As we will show in Section V, however, even such small movements in tax rates can imply large movements in business profits, making business campaign contributions a worthwhile investment.
C. Extensions
This subsection extends our empirical results in five directions. First, we have thus far measured BCC as contributions to candidates for state houses of representatives because house elections are held every two years and, relative to senate and gubernatorial elections, a continuity exists across time and states in terms of the fraction of house seats up for election each cycle.
Nonetheless, here we consider whether the results are robust to using a broader measure that corresponding results in Columns 1 to 3 of Table 3 . The estimated γs are also similar for SCT and CAW, but the sign for the ITC regression is now negative (though, as before, the coefficient sum remains statistically insignificant). Specifically, the estimated γs are -0.337 (p = 0.065), -0.366 (p = 0.663), and -6.014 (p = 0.001) for SCT, ITC, and CAW, respectively.
Second, we explore whether BCC for winning house candidates has different effects on tax policy than does BCC for losing house candidates. We find statistically insignificant differences, though this result is driven by the large standard errors on the estimated γ winning and γ losing coefficients rather than economically similar point estimates. This imprecision appears to be traceable to the substantial collinearity between BCC for winning and losing candidates.
Third, our preferred model specification contains lags of
 to recognize that capital mobility or legislated changes in tax rates may be gradual processes taking more than one year to complete. Here we explore the importance of dynamics by considering two alternative specifications. We first assume that a static specification is appropriate, and thus constrain 1  and 2  to equal zero in equation (2) For all three tax variables, the estimated γs remain largely unaffected. In the second alternative specification, we allow for longer lags by replacing the first and second lags of Neither of these specifications with a lagged dependent variable delivers plausible results for α or γ.
Fourth, the econometric specifications of tax competition models considered above focused on tax variables directly controlled by policymakers. However, as noted in Section III.A, these legislated tax variables do not provide a comprehensive measure of the total tax assessed on capital and may not reflect nuances in the tax code that affect capital taxation. Table   4 presents results with the average corporate tax rate (ACT) as the tax variable for both RE and FE specifications. The reaction function slopes continue to be negative, though they are not estimated very precisely. By contrast, the impact of including BCC in the ACT model is greater than in the SCT model. Relative to the comparable coefficient sums in Table 3 , the γs from Table 4 are larger --they imply that a one s.d. movement of BCC is associated with a reduction in ACT of 7% to 9% of the s.d. of ACT --and they are estimated more precisely.
Fifth, a major advantage of panel data is that the econometric model can control for statespecific effects that are time invariant. If these effects are important for tax policy and correlated with other factors entering the econometric equation, ignoring their impact, as must be done in cross-section regressions, can lead to very different estimates. To explore the importance of state-specific effects, we reestimate our models without controlling for random or fixed effects.
The results reported in columns 3 to 5 in Table 4 are very different from the estimates reported above. For example, recall from Table 3 Similarly substantial and perverse changes occur for γ ITC from its point estimate in Table 3 of approximately 0.700 to −1.310 (p = 0.381) in Table 4 . The γ CAW coefficient does not change sign, but its point estimate changes markedly from approximately -6.660 in Table 3 to −17.180
(p = 0.000) in Table 4 . These results highlight the critical importance of controlling for state effects in panel data.
V. THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF BUSINESS CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
Up to this point, we have not explored the economic value implied by the BCC coefficients. How much does a dollar of business contributions "buy" in terms of reduced taxes?
We answer this question with respect to an implied change in the corporate income tax rate. We focus here only on SCT because the results reported above suggest that BCC does not have a statistically significant effect on ITC and interpreting the corporate tax savings from a change in CAW is complicated given it necessarily involves an offsetting increase in the sales or payroll factor weights in a state's nationwide income apportionment formula. Moreover, the SCT is generally considered the most important capital tax policy.
We begin with the following equation for corporate taxes paid, 
where we have assumed that the ratio of average to statutory tax rates and before-tax profits are unaffected by the change in the statutory corporate tax rate. The 
The elements appearing in equations (5) are quantified as follows.
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The  coefficient is the fixed effects estimate of -0.375 taken from column 4 of (5), explicit deflation, which would occur with aggregate deflators, is unnecessary. 0.065. The RAS variable is the average of this ratio and equals 0.536.
Based on these numbers and the formula above, business campaign contributions appear to have considerable economic value. A $1 campaign contribution yields $6.65 in state corporate tax savings. The result is very similar -$7.00 -if one instead uses the random effects estimate of  (from column 1 of Table 3 ).
These figures beg the question, if the value of $1 of business campaign contributions is greater than $1, why do businesses not contribute more, raising contributions until the point at which the excess return is eliminated? 14 There are two possible explanations, which are not mutually-exclusive, to this "Tullock Puzzle" (1972) . First, the above calculation of estimated economic value is based on the assumption that each business is simultaneously making a marginal contribution. No mechanism exists, however, for ensuring the substantial mutual gains are realized. Businesses face a classic free-rider problem with the associated underprovision of a public good (lobbying). 14 Our results contribute to the lively debate concerning whether campaign contributions are an investment by firms for political influence or consumption by participants in the political process. See the survey by Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder (2003) and the evidence that they present in favor of the consumption view. Recent results by Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov (2009) favor the investment view; they find a large positive impact of business contributions to federal elections on returns. By contrast, Aggarwal, Meschke, and Wang (2008) find that business contributions to federal elections are negatively related to future returns because of a link between contributions and corporate governance problems.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper has explored the role played by business campaign contributions in determining state tax policy in a world of mobile capital. We expand the standard model of tax competition to allow for the influence of business contributions on the corporate income tax rate, the investment tax credit rate, the capital apportionment weight, and the average corporate tax rate. Our empirical model explains each of these tax policies as functions of tax policies in competitive states (reflecting the usual role of tax competition) and business contributions, as well as control variables for the economic and political environment, state effects, and time fixed effects.
Based on a panel of U.S. states and unique data on business campaign contributions, our empirical work uncovers four key results. First, we document a significant direct effect of business contributions on tax policy. For example, in our preferred regressions in Table 3 , we find that the coefficients on our business campaign contributions variables are negative and statistically significant at conventional levels (or nearly so in one case) for the statutory corporate income tax and capital apportionment weight. Second, these estimates imply that the economic value of a $1 business campaign contribution in terms of lower state corporate taxes is approximately $6.65. This large gap between the benefits and costs of campaign contributions suggests that businesses have much to gain from coordinated contributions and/or that campaign contribution limits have been effective in limiting contributions. Third, the slope of the reaction function between tax policy in a given state and the tax policies of its competitive states is negative, and this slope is robust to including business campaign contributions in the econometric equation. This negative slope reflects a reaction to an inflow of capital (due to an increase in capital taxes in neighboring jurisdictions) that creates an opportunity for residents to maintain the current level of public services at a lower tax rate; a negative income elasticity for public goods compels residents to act on that opportunity. Fourth, we highlight the sensitivity of the empirical results to state effects. For example, when state effects are removed, the regression results imply the perverse result that business campaign contributions raise the statutory corporate income tax rate (column 3 of Table 4 ).
These provocative results call for further research aimed at understanding the determinants of business campaign contributions and the "Tullock Puzzle," the persistence of a large gap between benefits and costs. What constraints prevent businesses from making additional contributions and exploiting these huge benefits? Are campaign contribution limits effective in constraining business campaign contributions? We intend to examine these and related issues in future research.
APPENDIX A: DOCUMENTATION FOR DATA ON BUSINESS CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION LIMITS
Business Campaign Contributions
With financial support from the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, we purchased data on state campaign contributions from the National Institute of Money in State Politics (NIMSP). The NIMSP collects data on contributions from individuals and organizations to individual candidates for state government office. The following statement is from the NIMSP website (www.followthemoney.org) and describes the sources of their data:
The Institute receives its data in either electronic or paper files from the state disclosure agencies with which candidates must file their campaign finance reports. The Institute collects the information for all state-level candidates in the primary and general elections and then puts it into a database.
Staff members verify that all candidates are represented and that their political party affiliations and win/loss statuses are correct. Researchers then standardize the contributor names and assign political donors an economic interest code, based either on the occupation and employer information contained in the disclosure reports or on information found through a variety of research resources. These codes are closely modeled on designations used by the federal government for classifying industry groups.
While identifying and coding major labor and industry contributions is relatively straightforward, doing so for individual contributors can be more difficult. In many cases, the state requires that contributors provide the campaigns with their occupation and/or employer. When that information is available, the Institute uses it to assign a category code for individual contributors. When that information is not required or candidates do not provide it, the staff uses standard research tools to determine an economic or political identity. Phone directories provided on CD or through the Internet often include a Standard Industrial Classification for an individual contributor, particularly those who own their own business or are in an easily identifiable profession such as attorney, doctor, insurance salesman, or real estate agent. Professional directories provide additional information, as does Polk's Reverse Directories.
Contributors for whom researchers cannot determine an economic interest from the information available receive a code indicating their interest is Unknown.
The NIMSP provided us with the "Summary File" for each state and invaluable explanations of details about their data. A state's Summary File contains dollar values of contributions to individual candidates, by year, aggregated across all contributors within a "sector." These sectors include industries as well as labor organizations, "ideologies," political parties, etc. We define the "business" supersector as the sum of the following nine sectors: agriculture; construction; communications and electronics; defense; energy and natural resources; finance, insurance, and real estate; general business; transportation; and health. 17 We first aggregate contributions across these nine sectors to obtain business contributions by candidate, year, and state. Similarly, we aggregate contributions over the remaining sectors to obtain non-business contributions.
The Summary Files also provide detailed information on the candidate receiving the donations -in particular, their "office" (e.g., governor, lieutenant governor, house or assembly, senate, supreme court, attorney general, comptroller, treasurer, public utility commission, secretary of state, etc.) and "status." Status indicates the outcome of the candidate's candidacy as of the end of the year. Candidacies in the data can have one of the following nine statuses: general election (GE) win, GE loss, primary election loss, withdrawal, disqualification, death, unknown, still pending (as of end of year), and "did not run" (meaning the candidate received contributions in that year but was not running for office that year).
We then aggregate business contributions across candidates, by year and state, for each status and for four categories of "office": gubernatorial (includes both governor and lieutenant governor because in some states these candidates are listed on a joint ticket and so it is not possible for NIMSP to separate contributions between the gubernatorial candidate and lieutenant governor candidate), house (variously called by states, "house of assembly", "house of delegates", and "house of representatives"), senate, and other statewide office. In Nebraska, which has a unicameral state legislature, legislative candidates' offices are coded as "senate."
The resulting panel data set has state-year observations on 36 business campaign contributions variables: contributions to candidates for each of the four offices above and for each of the nine statuses above. 17 The above description by the NIMSP of their extensive efforts to assign contributions from individuals to a particular economic sector, may lead one to think that contributions from individuals, as opposed to organizations, is the bulk of business contributions. They are not. According to the breakdown of contributions by individuals vs. organizations provided on the NIMSP website, individuals make up around a third to a half of business contributions (depending on the state and year). 1989 -1990 12 1991 -1992 12 1993 -1994 19 1995 -1996 33 1997 -1998 41 1999 -2000 47 2001 -2002 48 2003 -2004 48 2005 -2006 48 As indicated by the table above, contributions data in the NIMSP data set are not reported for all states in all years.
States can be categorized into four groups to describe their data availability:
1. Most (40 of 48) states have only even-year data on business contributions. These states have biennial electoral cycles that end in even-years and report contributions over the entire two-year period in that single even-year.
2. Two states -New Jersey and Virginia -have only odd-year contributions data; they have biennial electoral cycles ending in odd-years and report contributions over the entire twoyear period in that single odd-year.
3. Five states -Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin -have biennial, even-year elections but report contributions that take place in either election years or non-election (odd) years. For these states, off-election-year contributions generally are for statewide offices other than governor, house, or senate (so governor, house, or senate contributions generally are just for even years, like the 40 states in the first group above).
4. California has a biennial, even-year cycle like group 1 above but has contributions reported for 2003 in connection with the special gubernatorial recall election in that year.
Since most states only report contributions at a two-year, electoral-cycle frequency, it is not known how contributions are divided among the two years within a cycle. If non-election-year contributions are generally close to zero, then the appropriate way to handle the data is to assign all of the contributions for the cycle to the election year and assume unreported contributions are 0 in non-election years. In this case, the data set constructed at an annual frequency is appropriate for the purposes of our regression analysis.
Campaign Contributions Limits
There are at least six different kinds of campaign contribution limits (CCLs): (1) on corporate contributions, (2) on individual contributions, (3) on candidates' own and family contributions, (4) on political action committee (PAC) contributions, (5) on labor union contributions, and (6) on contributions by political parties.
The basic principle we use for constructing a uniform panel of data for these six types of CCLs is as follows: "What is the maximum amount that a contributor (individual, corporation, candidate, PAC, union, or party) could make to a single candidate in this state in this electoral cycle?" There are two main categories of CCLs: CCLs that set a maximum contribution limit from a single contributor to a specific candidate (the easiest case to record in our dataset), and
CCLs that cap aggregate contributions from a single contributor to all candidates seeking a particular office, such as governor or state senate. In the latter case, we assume that the contributor would use their entire allowable donation (if binding) for one candidate, to maximize impact. Contribution maximums in the dataset specify the most a contributor can contribute in a particular election cycle, which includes both the primary and general elections. In states where the limit applies on a calendar-year basis, we multiply it by 2 to be (roughly) equivalent to a primary/general cycle.
Nebraska is a special case, where candidates are limited in the total amount they can receive in corporate donations. The assumption used to enter this information in our dataset is that one donor can give an amount equal to this maximum (e.g., $825,000 for governor).
There have been a number of court cases on whether particular campaign finance limits are unconstitutional, which is a primarily reason for the large amount of within-state variation in CCLs over time. Some states (e.g., Colorado) abandoned all limits for 2 years, then rolled out new ones that presumably passed Constitutional muster. This is one reason to think CCLs are exogenous with respect to a state's tax policy.
In a handful of states, the maximum contribution limit is higher if the candidate agrees to spending limits (New Hampshire) or is qualified to receive public funding (Rhode Island). In these cases, we assume that these higher limits apply.
Our data sources for CCLs are as follows: Tables 1 and 2 for details about the table entries. The instrument for i,t BCC is the number of candidates that ran for a state house seat. The selection of the instrument set is described in Section III.C on The Panel Dataset/Business Campaign Contributions Variables; the instrument discussed above corresponds to item (B) listed in that sub-section. The coefficients for i,t BCC , i,t 1 BCC  , and  are multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate presentation. For the models reported in Table 3 , an eigenvalue statistic greater than 8.8 or 14.0 rejects the null hypothesis of instrument irrelevance constructed with a bias of 10% or 5%, respectively. 
